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Abstract
There is a significant conceptual gap between legal and mathematical thinking around data
privacy. The effect is uncertainty as to which technical offerings adequately match expectations
expressed in legal standards. The uncertainty is exacerbated by a litany of successful privacy
attacks, demonstrating that traditional statistical disclosure limitation techniques often fall short
of the sort of privacy envisioned by legal standards.
We define predicate singling out, a new type of privacy attack intended to capture the concept
of singling out appearing in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Informally, an
adversary predicate singles out a dataset x using the output of a data release mechanism M(x)
if it manages to find a predicate p matching exactly one row x ∈ x with probability much better
than a statistical baseline. A data release mechanism that precludes such attacks is secure
against predicate singling out (PSO secure).
We argue that PSO security is a mathematical concept with legal consequences. Any data
release mechanism that purports to “render anonymous” personal data under the GDPR must
be secure against singling out, and hence must be PSO secure. We then analyze PSO security,
showing that it fails to self-compose. Namely, a combination of ω(log n) exact counts, each
individually PSO secure, enables an attacker to predicate single out. In fact, the composition
of just two PSO-secure mechanisms can fail to provide PSO security.
Finally, we ask whether differential privacy and k-anonymity are PSO secure. Leveraging a
connection to statistical generalization, we show that differential privacy implies PSO security.
However, k-anonymity does not: there exists a simple and general predicate singling out attack
under mild assumptions on the k-anonymizer and the data distribution.
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1 Introduction
Data privacy laws—like HIPAA, FERPA, and Title 13 in the US, and the GDPR in the EU—govern
the use of sensitive personal information.1 These laws delineate the boundaries of appropriate use
of personal information and impose steep penalties upon rule breakers. To adhere to these laws,
practitioners need to apply suitable controls and statistical disclosure limitation techniques. Many
commonly used techniques including k-anonymity, bucketing, rounding, pseudonymization, and
swapping offer privacy protections that are seemingly intuitive but only poorly understood. And
while there is a vast literature of best practices, a litany of successful privacy attacks demonstrates
that these techniques often fall short of the sort of privacy envisioned by legal standards.2
A more disciplined approach is needed. However, there is a significant conceptual gap between
legal and mathematical thinking around data privacy. Privacy regulations are grounded in legal
concepts such as personally-identifiable information (PII), linkage, distinguishability, anonymiza-
tion, risk, and inference. In contrast, much of the recent progress in data privacy technology is
rooted in mathematical privacy models such as differential privacy [DMNS06] that offer a founda-
tional treatment of privacy, with formal privacy guarantees. And while such techniques are being
actively developed in the academy, industry, and government, there is a basic disconnect between
the legal and mathematical conceptions. The effect is uncertainty as to which technical offerings
adequately match expectations expressed in legal standards [NW18].
Bridging between legal and technical concepts of privacy. We aim to address this un-
certainty by translating between the legal and the technical. To do so, we begin with a concept
appearing in the law, then model some aspect of it mathematically. With the mathematical for-
malism in hand, we can better understand the requirements of the law, their implications, and the
techniques that might satisfy them.
This is part of a larger effort to bridge between legal and technical conceptions of privacy. An
earlier work analyzed the privacy requirements of FERPA and modeled them in a game-based
definition, as is common in cryptography. The definition was used to argue that the use of differen-
tially private analyses suffices for satisfying a wide range of interpretation of FERPA [NBW+18].
An important feature of FERPA that enabled this analysis is that FERPA and its accompanying
documents contain a rather detailed description of a privacy attacker and the attacker’s goals.
In this work we focus on the concept of singling out from the GDPR. More specifically, we
examine what it means for a data anonymization mechanism to ensure security against singling
out in a data release. Preventing singling out attacks in a dataset is a necessary (but maybe not
sufficient) precondition for a dataset to be considered effectively anonymized and thereby free from
regulatory restrictions under the GDPR. Ultimately, our goal is to better understand a concept
foundational to the GDPR, enabling a rigorous mathematical examination of whether certain classes
of techniques (e.g., k-anonymity, differential privacy, pseudonymization) provide an important legal
protection.
We are not the first to study this issue. “Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques” [A29b] provides
guidance about the use of various privacy technologies—including k-anonymity and differential
privacy—as anonymization techniques. It’s analysis is centered on asking whether each technology
1HIPAA is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. FERPA is the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act. Title 13 of the US Code mandates the role of the US Census. GDPR is the EU General Data
Protection Regulation.
2See, e.g., [Ohm10].
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effectively mitigates three risks: “singling out, linkability, and inference.” For instance, [A29b]
concludes that with k-anonymity singling is no longer a risk whereas with differential privacy it
“may not” be a risk. Though similar in purpose to our work, its technical analyses are informal
and coarse. Reconsidering these questions with mathematical rigor, we encourage revisiting the
conclusions in [A29b].
1.1 Singling out in the GDPR
We begin with the text of the GDPR. It consists of articles detailing the obligations placed on
processors of personal data as well as recitals containing explanatory remarks. Article 1 of the
regulation delineates its scope as “lay[ing] down rules relating to the protection of natural persons
with regard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free movement of personal
data.” The GDPR places no restrictions on the processing of non-personal data, even if this data
is the result of anonymizing personal data.3 Personal data is defined in Article 4 to mean “any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person; an identifiable natural person
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly.” What it means for a person to be “identified,
directly or indirectly” is not elaborated in the articles of the GDPR. Recital 26 sheds a little more
light: “To determine whether a natural person is identifiable account should be taken of all the
means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another
person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly.” Singling out is one way to identify a
person in data, and only data that does not allow singling out may be excepted from the regulation.4
For insight as to the regulation’s meaning, we refer to two documents prepared by the Article 29
Data Protection Working Party, an advisory body set out by the EU Data Protection Directive.5
“Opinion on the Concept of Personal Data” [A29a] elaborates on the meaning of “identifiable,
directly or indirectly.” A person is identified “within a group of persons [when] he or she is
distinguished from all other members of the group.” One way of distinguishing a person from a
group is by specifying “criteria which allows him to be recognized by narrowing down the group
to which he belongs.” If the group is narrowed down to an individual, that individual has been
singled out.6 Looking ahead, we will call this isolating an individual in the dataset and argue that
not every instance of isolation should be considered a singling out attack.
We highlight three additional insights that inform our work. First, identification does not require
a name or any other traditional identifier. For instance, singling out can be done with a “small or
large” collection of seemingly innocuous traits (e.g., “the man wearing a black suit”). Indeed, this
is what is meant by “indirectly identifiable.” An example of singling out in practice cited by [A29b]
showed that four locations sufficed to uniquely identify 95% of people in a pseudonymized dataset
of time-stamped locations. This is considered singling out even though no method of linking such
3Recital 26 emphasizes this point: “The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous
information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal
data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable.”
4Interestingly, singling out is the only criterion for identifiability explicitly mentioned in the GDPR, the only
occurrence the term being the quoted passage from Recital 26.
5Formally, Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data. 95/46/EC.
6The notion of “singling out” is not defined in the Opinion on the Concept of Personal Data [A29a]. It is used
in [A29a] four times, each consistent with the above interpretation. Our interpretation coincides with and was initially
inspired by that of [FPEO+18], defining “singling out as occurring when an analyst correctly makes a statement of
the form ‘There is exactly one user that has these attributes.’ ”
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location traces to individuals’ names was identified.
Second, identifiable data may come in many forms, including microdata, aggregate statistics,
news articles, encrypted data, video footage, and server logs. What’s important is not the form
of the data, its whether the data permits an individual to be singled out. We apply this same
principle to the manner in which an individual is singled out within a dataset. Most examples
focus on specifying a collection of attributes (e.g., four time-stamped locations) that match a single
person in the data. The collection of attributes corresponds to a predicate: a function that assigns
to each person in the dataset a value 0 or 1 (interpreted as false or true respectively). We interpret
the regulation as considering data to be personal if an individual can be distinguished within a
dataset using any predicate, not only those that correspond to specifying collections of attributes.
Just as “small or large” collections of attributes may be used to single out, we allow these predicates
to be simple or complex.
Third, whether or not a collection of attributes identifies a person is context-dependent. “A
very common family name will not be sufficient to identify someone - i.e. to single someone out -
from the whole of a country’s population, while it is likely to achieve identification of a pupil in
a classroom.” Both the prevalence of the name and the size of the group are important in the
example, and will be important in our formalization.
1.2 Our contributions
1.2.1 Defining security against predicate singling out
In this work, we formalize and analyze predicate singling out, a notion which is intended to partially
model the GDPR’s notion of singling out. Following the discussion above, we begin with the idea
that singling out an individual from a group involves specifying a predicate that uniquely distin-
guishes the individual, which we call isolation. Using this terminology, an intuitive interpretation
of the GDPR’s requirement is that to be considered secure against singling out, a function of the
data must prevent isolation. Trying to make this idea formal, we will see that it requires some
refinement.
We restrict our attention to datasets x = (x1, . . . , xn) of size n, where each row xi is sampled
according to some underlying probability distribution D over a universe X. The dataset x is
assumed to contain personal data corresponding to individuals, with at most one row per individual.
For example, x might consist of home listings, hospital records, internet browsing history, or any
other personal information. A mechanism M takes x as input and outputs some data release M(x),
be it a map of approximate addresses, aggregate statistics about disease, or pseudonymized internet
histories. We call M an anonymization mechanism because it purportedly anonymizes the personal
data x.
An adversary A attempts to output a predicate p : X → {0, 1} that isolates a row in x, i.e.,
there exists i such that p(xi) = 1 and p(xj) = 0 for all j 6= i. We emphasize that it is rows in the
original dataset x on which the predicate acts, not the output y. In part, this is a byproduct of
our desire to make no assumptions on the form of M ’s output. While it might make sense to apply
a predicate to pseudonymized microdata, it is far from clear what it would mean for a synthetic
dataset or for aggregate statistics. Observe that this choice also rules out predicates p that “isolate”
rows by referring to their position in x (i.e., “the seventh row”).
M prevents isolation if there doesn’t exist an adversary A that isolates a row in x except with
very small probability over the randomness of sampling x ← Dn, the mechanism y ← M(x), and
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the adversary A(y). Unfortunately, this is impossible to achieve by any mechanism M . To wit,
there is a trivial adversary—one that that doesn’t look at y and denoted by T(⊥)—that isolates
a row with probability approximately 0.37. The adversary simply outputs p that matches a 1/n
fraction of the distribution D. For example, for a dataset of size n = 365 random people selected at
random from the United States population, T(⊥) may simply output p = (born on March 15th).
This predicate will isolate a row with probability (1 − 1/365)364 ≈ 37%. Isolation is hence not
necessarily indicative of a failure to protect against singling out, as T(⊥) would succeed with
≈ 37% probability (for any n) even if M does not output anything at all.7
A trivial adversary can give us a baseline against which to measure isolation success. But the
baseline should not simply be 37% chance of success. Consider the earlier example of a dataset of
365 random Americans. What if an adversary output predicates like p = (born on March 15th ∧
vegan ∧ speaks Dutch ∧ concert pianist), and managed to isolate 10% of the time? Though 10% is
much less than 37%, the predicate is extremely specific and unlikely to isolate a person by chance.
We formalize this intuition by considering the baseline risk of isolation as a function of the weight of
p, i.e., the chance that p matches a random row sampled from the distribution D. The baseline for
predicates of weight 1/n is 37%, but the baseline for an extremely specific predicate may be much
lower. The more specific the predicate, the closer the baseline gets to zero. Our primary focus in
this paper is on the regime of predicate weights where the baseline is negligible, corresponding to
predicates with negligible weight.8 We get:
Definition 3.6 (informal) An adversary predicate singles out a row in x if it outputs a predicate
that isolates a row with probability significantly higher than the baseline risk. A mechanism M is
secure against predicate singling out (PSO-secure) if no adversary can use its output to predicate
single out.
1.2.2 Analyzing security against predicate singling out
Having formulated security against singling out, our next goal is to understand the guarantee
it offers, what mechanisms satisfy it, and how this concept relates to existing privacy concepts,
including differential privacy and k-anonymity.
Two desirable properties of a privacy concept are robustness to post-processing and to compo-
sition. The former requires that if a mechanism M is deemed secure, then anything that can be
computed using the outcome of M should also be deemed secure. Hence, the outcome may be reused
without creating additional privacy risk. For instance, if a PSO-secure mechanism M outputs mi-
crodata, then any statistics that can be computed from that microdata should also be PSO-secure.
It follows directly from the definition of PSO security that it is robust to post-processing.
We would like that the privacy risk of multiple data releases is not significantly greater than the
accumulated risks of the individual releases. In this case, we say that the privacy concept composes.
We prove that PSO security does not compose, and give two examples of this failure. First, we show
that releasing aggregate statistics is PSO-secure but fails to compose super-logarithmically many
times. A collection of ω(log(n)) counts may allow an adversary to isolate a row with probability
arbitrarily close to one using a predicate with negligible weight (and negligible baseline). Second,
we construct less natural pair of mechanisms that individually are PSO-secure but together allow
7In Section 3.2 we show that T(⊥) need not know the distribution D to isolate with probability ≈ 37% if D has
sufficient min-entropy.
8For completeness, we also consider in Section 3 predicates of weight ω(logn/n), where the baseline is also
negligible.
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the recovery of a row in the dataset. The first mechanism extracts and outputs a secret encryption
key from one part of x. The second extracts the same key and uses it to encrypt the last row
xn ∈ x, outputting the corresponding ciphertext. The mechanisms individually prevent predicate
singling out, but together completely fail.
Next, we ask whether existing privacy concepts guarantee PSO security. We already know
that differential privacy is not necessary for PSO security as exact counts are PSO-secure but not
differentially private. However, differential privacy does provide PSO security. The proof relies
on the connection between differential privacy and statistical generalization guarantees [DFH+15,
BNS+16]. We show that predicate singling out implies a form of overfitting to the underlying
dataset. If M is differentially private it prevents this form of overfitting, and hence protects against
predicate singling out.
Finally, we examine k-anonymity [SS98] and show that it does not prevent predicate singling out
attacks. Instead, it enables an adversary to predicate single out with probability approximately
37% using extremely low-weight predicates for which the baseline risk is negligible. Briefly, the
attack begins by observing that typical k-anonymous algorithms “almost” predicate single out.
They reveal predicates—usually, collections of attributes—that are satisfied by only k rows in the
dataset. In an effort to make the k-anonymized data as useful as possible, these predicates are as
descriptive and specific as possible. To predicate single out a row from the dataset of size n using
the k-anonymous output, it roughly suffices to predicate single out a row from any grouping of k
rows in the output.
1.3 Implication for the GDPR
Precisely formalizing predicate singling out attacks allows us to examine with mathematical rigor
the extent to which specific algorithms and paradigms protect against them. In particular, we
show that k-anonymity fails to prevent predicate singling out, but that differential privacy prevents
predicate singling out. Our conclusions contrast with those of the Article 29 Working Party:
they conclude that k-anonymity eliminates the risk of singling out while differential privacy “may
not” [A29b]. These disagreements may raise a doubt about whether our modeling indeed matches
the regulators’ intent.
Our goal in interpreting the text of the GDPR and related documents, and in defining predicate
singling out, is to provide a precise mathematical formalism to capture some aspect of the concept
of personal data (as elucidated in the regulation and in [A29a]) and the associated concept of
anonymization. We want to render mathematically falsifiable a legal claim that a given algorithmic
technique anonymizes personal data by providing a necessary condition for such anonymizers.
We argue that predicate singling out succeeds. A number of modeling choices limit the scope
of our definition, but limiting the scope poses no issue. Specifically, (i) we only consider randomly
sampled datasets; (ii) we only consider an attacker who has no additional knowledge of the dataset
besides the output of a mechanism; (iii) we do not require that isolation be impossible, instead
comparing to a baseline risk of isolation. A technique that purports to anonymize all personal
data against all attackers must at least do so against randomly sampled data and against limited
attackers. And unless the idea of anonymization mechanisms is completely vacuous, one must
compare against a baseline risk.
We must be careful not when narrowing our definition’s scope, but when expanding it. The most
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significant expansion9 is our choice to parameterize the baseline risk by the weight of a predicate.
But this is a minimal expansion and only done to prevent a severe weakness. Not doing so would
mean that a mechanism that published the first row of the dataset 20% of the time could be said
to “prevent singling out.” Any meaningful instantiation of “preventing singling out” should rule
out such mechanisms. Ours is a natural way of doing so.
This does not mean that our modeling is the only one possible. As the starting point for the
analysis is a description which does not use mathematical formalism, but is rather a (somewhat
incomplete) description using natural language. It is certainly plausible that alternative mathe-
matical formalizations of singling out could be extracted from the very same text. We are looking
forward to seeing such formalizations emerge.
Finally, one may still claim that the assessments made in [A29b] should be taken as ground
truth and that the Article 29 WP meant for any interpretation of singling out to be consistent
with these assessments. That is, the protection provided by k-anonymity implicitly defines the
meaning of singling out (partially or in full). We believe, however, that such a position would be
hard to justify. To the best of our knowledge, the assessments made by the Article 29 WP were
not substantiated by a mathematical analysis. Furthermore, we caution against defining privacy
implicitly as the guarantee provided by particular techniques; this approach is doomed to fail. In
particular, the choice of defining privacy as the result of applying practices such as suppression
of directly identifying information has proved a problematic choice that unfortunately pervades
current legal privacy standards.
Is predicate singling out a good privacy concept? A predicate singling out attack can be
a stepping stone towards a greater harm, even in settings where isolation alone may not. It may
enable linking a person’s record in the dataset to some external source of information [NS08], or
targeting of individuals for differential treatment. As such, it is meaningful as a mode of privacy
failure, both in the GDPR context and otherwise.
And, while we believe that PSO security is relevant for the GDPR as a necessary property of
techniques that anonymize personal data, we do not consider it a sufficiently protective privacy
concept by itself. First, singling out is a specific mode of privacy failure. It is not clear that ruling
out this failure mode is sufficient for privacy (in particular, two other failure modes are mentioned
in [A29b]: linkage and inference). Second, our definition considers a setting where the underlying
data is chosen i.i.d. from some (unknown) underlying distribution, an assumption that is not true
in many real-life contexts. PSO security may not prevent singling out in such contexts. Lastly, we
believe that self-composition is an essential property of any reasonable privacy definition. However,
as we show in Section 4.3, security against singling out does not self compose.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. Let X = {0, 1}d be the data universe. A database x = (x1, . . . , xn) consists of n
elements taken from X. We often consider databases where each entry xi is chosen i.i.d. from a
probability distribution D ∈ ∆(X) over X.
For the purposes of asymptotic analyses, we will use the number of rows n ∈ N in a dataset
as the complexity parameter. Furthermore, the parameter d = d(n) is a function of n, but we
9We discuss additional subtleties in Section 3.3.
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typically omit the dependence.10
For a predicate p : X → {0, 1} we define weightD(p) , Ex∼D[p(x)] and for a database x ∈ Xn
we define p(x) , 1n
∑n
i=1 p(xi). A mechanism M is a Turing Machine that takes as input a database
x ∈ Xn. A mechanism M may be randomized and/or interactive.
We use U` for a random variable sampled from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}d. A function
f(n) is negligible in n if f(n) = n−ω(1); this is denoted f(n) = negl(n).
2.1 Preliminaries from randomness extraction
Definition 2.1 (Min-entropy, average min entropy [DORS08]). Let Y1, Y2 be two random variables.
The min-entropy of a Y1 is
H∞(Y1) = − log
(
max
y
Pr[Y1 = y]
)
.
The average min-entropy11of Y1 given Y2 is
H˜∞(Y1 | Y2) = − log
(
E
Y2
[
max
y
Pr[Y1 = y | Y2]
])
.
Fact 2.1. For all Y1 and Y2: H∞(Y1) ≥ H˜∞(Y1 | Y2) ≥ H∞(Y1)− log(|supp(Y2)|), where supp(Y2)
is the support of Y2.
Definition 2.2 (2-universal hash functions). H = {h : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m} is a 2-universal family
of hash functions if Prh∼H [h(x) = h(x′)] = 2−m for all x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}d where the probability is over
the selection of h uniformly at random from H.
As an example, for a, b ∈ {0, 1}d let ha,b(x) be the function that returns the first m bits of ax+b
where the arithmetic is in the field GF (2d). Then H = {ha,b : a, b ∈ {0, 1}d} is 2-universal.
Definition 2.3 (Statistical distance). The statistical distance of random variables Y1, Y2 with
support {0, 1}d is SD(Y1, Y2) = 12
∑
y∈{0,1}d
∣∣Pr[Y1 = y]−Pr[Y2 = y]∣∣. If SD(Y1, Y2) < α we say that
Y1 and Y2 are α-close.
Lemma 2.2 (Generalized Leftover Hash Lemma [DORS08]). Let λ ∈ N, α > 0, Y1 a random
variable over {0, 1}d, and Y2 a random variable. Let H = {h : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m} be a 2-universal
family of hash functions where m ≤ λ−2 log(1/α2)+2. For every Y1 and Y2 with H˜∞(Y1 | Y2) ≥ λ,
(h, h(Y1), Y2) is α
2-close to (h, Um, Y2) in total variation distance, where h ∈R H is a uniformly
random function from the hash family and Um is uniform over {0, 1}m.
Corollary 2.3. h(Y ) is α-close to uniform with probability at least 1− α over h ∈R H.
Proof. Let H>α = {h ∈ H : h(Y ) is not α close to uniform}. We have α2 ≥ ∆((h, h(Y )), unif) >
Pr[h ∈ H>α] · α. Hence Pr[h ∈ H>α] < α.
10More formally, we can consider an ensemble of data domains X = {Xn = {0, 1}d(n)}n∈N and an ensemble of
distributions D = {Dn}n∈N, where Dn ∈ ∆(Xn).
11In [Smi09] this same quantity is called conditional min-entropy and denoted H∞.
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3 Security against predicate singling out (PSO security)
We consider a setting in which a data controller has in its possession a dataset x = (x1, . . . , xn)
consisting of n rows sampled i.i.d. from a distribution D ∈ ∆(X). The data controller publishes the
output of an anonymization mechanism M applied to the dataset x. A predicate singling out (PSO)
adversary A is a non-uniform Turing machine with access to the mechanism M(x) and produces
a predicate p : X → {0, 1}.12 We abuse notation and write A(M(x)), regardless whether M is
an interactive or non-interactive mechanism. For now, we assume all adversaries have complete
knowledge of D and are computationally unbounded; we reexamine these choices in Section 3.3
below.
Intuitively, the adversary’s goal is to output predicate p that isolates a row in x, where we
associate the Article 29 WP Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques notion of “isolat[ing] some or
all records which identify an individual in [a] dataset” with the production of a description that
matches exactly one row in the dataset. Mathematically, the description would be in form of a
predicate mapping data universe elements into {0, 1}.
Definition 3.1 (Row isolation). A predicate p isolates a row in x if there exists a unique x ∈ x
such that p(x) = 1. I.e., if p(x) = 1/n. We denote this event iso(p,x).
It is tempting to require that a mechanism M only allow a negligible probability of isolating
a row, but this intuition is problematic. An adversary that does not have access to M—a trivial
adversary—can output a predicate p with weightD(p) ≈ 1/n and hence isolate a row in x with
probability
(
n
1
) · weightD(p) · (1 − weightD(p))n−1 ≈ e−1 ≈ 37%. In Section 3.2 we will see that in
many cases the trivial adversary need not know the distribution to produce such a predicate.
Instead of considering the absolute probability that an adversary outputs a predicate that
isolates a row, we consider the increase in probability relative to a baseline risk : the probability of
isolation by a trivial adversary.
Definition 3.2 (Trivial Adversary). A predicate singling out adversary T is trivial if the distribu-
tion over outputs of T is independent of M(x). That is T(M(x)) = T(⊥).
An unrestricted trivial adversary can isolate a row with probability about 1/e. Towards a more
expressive notion of the baseline risk, we restrict adversaries to output a predicate from a particular
class of admissible predicates P ⊆ {p : X → {0, 1}}, i.e., a subset of predicates on X.13
Definition 3.3 (Adversarial success probability). Let D be a distribution over X. For mechanism
M , an adversary A, a set of admissible predicates P , and n ∈ N, let
SuccA,MP (n,D) , Prx←Dn
p←A(M(x))
[iso(p,x) ∧ p ∈ P ].
Definition 3.4 (Baseline). For n ∈ N and set of admissible predicates P ,
baseD(n, P ) , sup
Trivial T
SuccT,⊥P (n,D)
12 As is typical in cryptography, strengthening the adversary to be non-uniform (including possibly having full
knowledge of the distribution D) yields stronger security definition. See Section 3.3 for further discussion.
13More formally, we restrict the adversary to an ensemble of admissible predicates P = {Pn}n∈N, where Pn ⊆ {p :
Xn → {0, 1}}, a subset of predicates on Xn.
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We typically omit the parameter D when the distribution is clear from context. In this work,
we focus on two classes of admissible predicates parameterized by the weight of the predicate p.
Definition 3.5 (Predicate families low and high). For 0 ≤ wlow(n) ≤ 1/n ≤ whigh(n) ≤ 1 we define
the predicate families
low = {p : weightD(p) ≤ wlow(n)} and high = {p : weightD(p) ≥ whigh(n)}.
We will consider the success probability of adversaries restricted to these admissible predicates
and will denote them SuccA,M≤wlow and Succ
A,M
≥whigh as shown in Figure 1.
Dn M A iso(p,x) ∧ weightD(p) ≤ wlow b ∈ {true, false}
x p
Figure 1: SuccA,M≤wlow(n,D) = PrD,M,A[b = true].
3.1 Security against predicate singling out
We now have the tools for presenting our definition of security against singling out. We require that
no adversary should have significantly higher probability of isolating a row than that of a trivial
adversary, conditioned on both outputting predicates from the same class of admissible predicates.
Definition 3.6 (Security against predicate singling out). For (n) > 0, δ(n) > 0, 0 ≤ wlow(n) ≤
1/n ≤ whigh(n) ≤ 1, we say a mechanism M is (, δ, wlow, whigh) secure against predicate singling
out ((, δ, wlow, whigh)-PSO secure) if for all adversaries A and distributions D:
SuccA,M≤wlow(n,D) ≤ e(n) · baseD(n, low) + δ(n),
SuccA,M≥whigh(n,D) ≤ e(n) · baseD(n, high) + δ(n). (1)
We often omit explicit reference to the parameter n for , δ, wlow, and whigh.
We say a mechanism is secure against predicate singling out (PSO secure) if for all wlow =
negl(n), whigh = ω(
logn
n ) there exists δ = negl(n) such that M is (0, δ, wlow, whigh)-PSO secure.
The definition is strengthened as  and δ get smaller, and as wlow and whigh get closer to 1/n. As
shown below, when wlow = negl(n) the baseline is negligible. This is probably the most important
regime of Definition 3.6 as such predicates are likely to not only isolate a row in the database but
also an individual in the entire population. The baseline is also negligible when whigh = ω(log n/n).
It is not clear to the authors how beneficial finding a predicate in this regime may be to an attacker.
The reader may decide to ignore Equation 1 in Definition 3.6 (as is depicted in Figure 1). We include
the high weight regime in our analysis so as not to overlook potential singling out risks which rely
on high weight predicates.
We also define a strong notion of predicate singling out, where an adversary can simultaneously
isolate all rows of a dataset.
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Definition 3.7 (Fully Predicate Singling Out). An adversary A fully singles out against a mecha-
nism M and distribution D if (with high probability) it outputs a collection of n negligible-weight
predicates pi, each of which isolates a different row of the input dataset x. More formally, if
Pr
x←Dn
(p1,...,pn)←A(M(x))
[∀pi, pj : iso(pi,x) ∧ weightD(pi) = negl(n) ∧ (pi ∧ pj)(x) = 0] > 1−negl(n) (2)
Examples. On input (x1, . . . , xn) the mechanismMf outputs (f(x1), . . . , f(xn)) for some possibly
randomized function f . Whether Mf prevents predicate singling out depends on f . On one
extreme, if f(x) = x and |X|  n, then Mf provides no protection. On the other extreme, if
f(x) is completely random, Mf (x) contains no information about x and provides no benefit to the
adversary. More formally, for all x the output of Mf (x) is uniform; this allows us to construct a
trivial adversary T that perfectly simulates any adversary A.14
If f is invertible, then it offers no more protection than the identity function. However, f being
many-to-one does not give an assurance. For instance, suppose the data is uniform over {0, 1}n
and f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n/2 outputs the last n/2 bits of an input x. Mf is not secure. Indeed, it
allows fully predicate singling out. For any yi = f(xi) in the output, the adversary can output the
predicate pi : (x) 7→ I(f(x) = yi). Pr[iso(pi,x)] = 1− negl(n) and weightUn(pi) = 2−n/2 = negl(n).
3.2 Bounding the baseline
In this section, we characterize the baseline over intervals in terms of a simple function B(n,w).
For n ≥ 2 and a predicate p of weight w, the probability over x ∼ Dn that p isolates a row in x is
B(n,w) , n · w · (1− w)n−1
B(n,w) is maximized at w = 1/n and strictly decreases moving away from the maximum. It is
helpful to recall that (1 − 1/n)n ≈ e−1 even for relatively small values of n. (1 − 1/n)n−1 also
approaches e−1 as n→∞, and does so from above.
As made formal in Claim 3.1 (proof in Appendix A), a trivial adversary maximizes its success of
isolating a row by outputting a predicate p with weightD(p) as close as possible to 1/n (the weight
that maximizes B(n,w)). The set of possible values for weightD(p) depends not only on wlow and
whigh, but also on the distribution. We say that a weight w ∈ [0, 1] is realizable under distribution
D if there exists p such that weightD(p) = w. The baseline is characterized by B(n,w).
Claim 3.1. For every n > 0, wlow, whigh and D,
baseD(n, lown) = B(n,w
∗
low(n)) and baseD(n, highn) = B(n,w
∗
high(n)),
where
w∗low(n) = sup{w ≤ wlow(n) : realizable} and w∗high(n) = inf{w ≥ whigh(n) : realizable}.
Because B(n,w) increases as w approaches 1/n, the baseline has a simple upper-bound.
14Uniformity without conditioning on x may not be enough. For example, if the data itself is uniform, then the
output of the identity function is also uniform. See also footnote 18.
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Corollary 3.2. For every wlow, whigh, n ∈ N and distribution D,
baseD(n, lown) ≤ B(n,wlow(n)) and baseD(n, highn) ≤ B(n,whigh(n)).
The dependence on the realizability of weights under D makes the exact baseline unwieldy.
For example, the difference between the true baseline and the upper bound can be as large as 1/e.
Thankfully, the B(n,w) upper bound is nearly tight when the underlying distribution has moderate
min-entropy. Moreover, the corresponding lower bound is achievable by an efficient uniform trivial
adversary who is oblivious of the distribution (see Section 3.3).
Claim 3.3 (Baseline Lower Bound). Let c > 0 and 0 ≤ wlow(n) ≤ 1/n ≤ whigh(n) ≤ 1. If D
has min-entropy at least λ > 5(c + log n + 2), then baseD(n, lown) ≥ B(n,wlow(n)) − 2−c and
baseD(n, highn) ≥ B(n,whigh(n))− 2−c.
Informally, the assumption that D has min-entropy λ implies two useful facts. First, the set
of realizable weights is dense: for any w, there exists a realizable w′ such that |w − w′| is small.
Second, the Leftover Hash Lemma allows us to construct an efficient uniform adversary who can
find a predicate with weight w′ without any knowledge of the distribution. The following lemma
(proved in Appendix A) captures these properties:
Lemma 3.4. For m ∈ N and a set X, let H = {h : X → {0, 1}m} be 2-universal family of
hash functions. For any w ≥ 2−(m−1) (respectively, w ≤ 1 − 2−(m−1)), there exists a collection
of predicates PH = {ph}h∈H such that for all distributions D over X with min-entropy at least
λ = 5m, weightD(ph) ∈ [w−3 ·2−m, w] with probability at least 1−2−m over h ∈R H. (respectively,
weightD(ph) ∈ [w,w + 3 · 2−m]).
Proof of Claim 3.3. We prove the claim for wlow(n); the proof for whigh(n) is analogous. Let m ≥
c + log n + 2. Either wlow(n) ≤ 2−(c+logn) or wlow(n) ≥ 2−(m−1). If wlow(n) ≤ 2−(c+logn), then
B(n,wlow) ≤ nwlow ≤ 2−c, making the claim trivial. It remains to consider wlow(n) ≥ 2−(m−1).
Let PH be the family of predicates from Lemma 3.4 and TH be a trivial adversary that outputs
a random ph ∈R PH . Recall that for any predicate p, Prx∼Dn [iso(p,x)] = B(n,weightD(p)). By
Lemma 3.4
SuccTH ,⊥low (n) ≥ Prx∼Dn,h∈RH[iso(ph,x) ∧ weightD(ph) ∈Wlow]
= Pr
h∈RH
[weightD(ph) ∈Wlow] · Pr
x∼Dn,h∈RH
[iso(ph,x) | weightD(ph) ∈Wlow]
≥ (1− 2−m) ·B(n, 3 · 2−m)
Observing that
∣∣dB
dw (w)
∣∣ ≤ dBdw (0) = n, SuccTH ,⊥low (n) ≥ B(n,wlow(n))−3·2−mn−2−m ≥ B(n,wlow(n))−
2−(m−logn−2) ≥ B(n,wlow(n))− 2−c.
Remark 3.5. The proof of Claim 3.3 requires only that is possible to sample a predicate such
that weightD(ph) ∈ Wlow. If we switch the order of quantifiers in the claim by allowing the trivial
adversary to depend on the distribution D, then the proof (and thus the trivial adversary) can be
derandomized. Indeed, for any D with sufficient min-entropy, there are many ph that can be used.
This observation is used in the proof of Theorem 4.6.
11
3.3 Reflections on modelling assumption
In many ways, Definition 3.6 requires a very high level of protection, similar to what is standard
in the foundations of cryptography. The definition requires a mechanism to provide security for
all distributions D and against non-uniform, computationally unbounded adversaries.15 The main
weakness in the required protection is that it considers only data that is i.i.d., whereas real-life
data cannot generally be modeled as i.i.d.
Any mechanism that purports to be a universal anonymizer of data under the GDPR—by
transforming personal data into non-personal data—must prevent singling out. Our definition is
intended to capture a necessary condition for a mechanism to be considered as rendering data
sufficiently anonymized under the GDPR. Any mechanism that prevents singling out in all cases
must prevent it in the special case that the data is i.i.d. from a distribution D. We view a failure
to provide security against predicate singling out (Definition 3.6) or is fully predicate singling out
(Definition 3.7) as strong evidence that a mechanism does not provide security against singling out;
hence, it does not protect from identification, as per the analysis in Section 1.1.
On the other hand, satisfying Definition 3.6 is not sufficient for arguing that a mechanism
renders data sufficiently anonymized under the GDPR. Singling out is only one of the many “means
reasonably likely to be used” to identify a person in a data release.16 Furthermore, the definition
considers only i.i.d. data; satisfying it may not even be sufficient to conclude that a mechanism
prevents singling out in all relevant circumstances.
4 Properties of PSO security
Two desirable properties of privacy concepts are that (i) immunity to post-processing, i.e., further
processing of the outcome of a mechanism, without access to the data, should not increase privacy
risks, and (ii) closure under composition, i.e., a combination of two or more mechanisms which
satisfy the requirements of the privacy concept is a mechanism that also satisfies the requirements
(potentially, with worse parameters). Differential privacy is an example of a privacy concept that
is immune to post-processing and is closed under composition.
In this section we prove that PSO security withstands post processing but not composition. We
give two demonstrations for the latter. In the first we consider mechanisms which count the number
of dataset rows satisfying a property. We show that releasing a count satisfies Definifion 3.6. How-
ever, there exists a collection of ω(log(n)) counts which allows an adversary to isolate a row with
probability arbitrarily close to one using a predicate with negligible weight. For the second demon-
stration, we construct a (less natural) pair of mechanisms that individually satisfy Definifion 3.6
but together allow the recovery of a row in the dataset. This latter construction borrows ideas
from [NSS+18]. An immediate conclusion is that PSO security is distinct from differential privacy.
More importantly, not being closed under composition is a significant weakness of the notion of
PSO security. Our constructions rely on very simple mechanisms that would likely be deemed se-
15 It is reasonable to limit the adversary in Definition 3.6 to polynomial time. If we restricted our attention to
distributions with moderate min-entropy, our results would remain qualitatively the same: our trivial adversaries and
lower bounds are all based on efficient and uniform algorithms; our upper bounds are against unbounded adversaries.
Relatedly, restricting to min-entropy distributions would allow us to switch the order of quantifiers of D and T in the
definition of the baseline without affecting our qualitative results.
16Article 29 Working Party Opinion on Anonymisation techniques [A29b] enumerates three criterions for identifi-
cation: singling out, linkage, and inference.
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cure against singling out under other formulations of the concept. It may well be that non-closure
under composition is inherent for singling out.
From a legal or policy point of view, we believe that a privacy concept which is not closed under
composition (or not immune to post-processing) should not be accepted as sufficient. Pragmatically,
the fact that PSO security is not closed under composition suggests that this concept can be used
for disqualifying privacy technology (if they are not PSO secure) but also that this concept must
be combined with other requirements if it used for approving technology.
4.1 Post Processing
For any non-interactive mechanism M , let F be a (possibly non-uniform) algorithm taking inputs
of the form M(x). Let F ◦M be the mechanism that on input x returns F (M(x)).
Lemma 4.1 (Postprocessing). If M is (ε, δ, wlow, whigh)-PSO secure, then F ◦M is too.
Proof. We show something stronger: for all M , F , A there exists AF such that for all n, P , D:
SuccAF ,MP (n) = Succ
A,F◦M
P (n). On input M(x), AF simulates A on input F (M(x)) and returns the
resulting predicate p. The distribution of AF ’s output with mechanism M is identical to that of A
with mechanism F ◦M , proving the lemma.
The definition and proof above extend to the case where the mechanism M is interactive.
4.2 Example PSO-secure mechanisms
This section presents two PSO-secure mechanisms. These examples are useful for developing in-
tuition for the PSO security notion. Additionally, they are the foundation for the examples of
self-composition failures in the next section.
4.2.1 Counting Mechanism
For any predicate q : X → {0, 1}, we define the corresponding Counting Mechanism:
Mechanism: Counting Mechanism M#q
input: x
return |{1 ≤ i ≤ n : q(xi) = 1}|
For example, consider the least-significant bit predicate lsb, that takes as input a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗
and outputs x[1]. The corresponding Counting Mechanism M#lsb returns the sum of the first
column of x.
The security of the Counting Mechanism is a corollary of the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. For all A, P , M : Xn 7→ Y : SuccA,MP (n) ≤ |Y | · base(n, P ), where Y is the
codomain of M .
Proof. We define a trivial adversary T such that for all A, SuccT,⊥P (n) ≥ 1|Y | · SuccA,MP (n). The
proposition follows by definition of base(n, P ). T samples a random y ∈R Y and returns p← A(y).
SuccT,⊥P (n) = Prx←Dn
y∈RY
p←A(y)
[iso(p,x) ∧ p ∈ P ] ≥ Succ
A,M
P
|Y |
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The inequality follows from the fact that for all databases x, there exists y∗ = y∗(x) ∈ Y such that
Pr
p←A(y∗)
[iso(p,x) ∧ p ∈ P ] ≥ Pr
p←A(M(x))
[iso(p,x) ∧ p ∈ P ],
and that for all x, Pry∈RY [y = y
∗] ≥ 1|Y | .
Corollary 4.3. M#q PSO secure.
As exact counts are not differentially private, this corollary demonstrates that differential pri-
vacy is not necessary for PSO security.
4.2.2 Predicate Mechanism
For any predicate q : X → {0, 1}, we define the corresponding Predicate Mechanism:
Mechanism: Predicate Mechanism Mq
input: x
return (q(x1), q(x2), . . . , q(xn))
Theorem 4.4. Mq is PSO secure.
We prove the security of Mq by showing that its output is “no more helpful” to the PSO
adversary than the counts returned by M#q.
Proposition 4.5 (Permutation Proposition). For a permutation σ : [n] → [n] of n elements and
a dataset x = (x1, . . . , xn), define σ(x) = (xσ(1), xσ(2), . . . , xσ(n)). For any mechanism M , let
M ◦ σ be the mechanism that on input x returns M(σ(x)). For all A, P , D, and σ: SuccA,MP (n) =
SuccA,M◦σP (n).
Proof. For all σ, the distributions Dn and σ(Dn) are identical. For all p and x, iso(p,x) if and only
if iso(p, σ(x)). Using these two observations:
SuccA,MP (n) = Prx←Dn
p←A(M(x))
[iso(p,x) ∧ p ∈ P ]
= Pr
x←Dn
p←A(M◦σ(x))
[iso(p, σ(x)) ∧ p ∈ P ]
= Pr
x←Dn
p←A(M◦σ(x))
[iso(p,x) ∧ p ∈ P ]
= SuccA,M◦σP (n)
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Consider M1 that on input x samples a random permutation σ and returns
Mq ◦ σ(x). By the Permutation Proposition, SuccA,M1P (n) = SuccA,MqP (n). Next, consider the
randomized algorithm F that on input m ∈ [n] outputs a uniformly random bitstring y ∈ {0, 1}n
of Hamming weight m. By Postprocessing and the security of M#q, the mechanism M2 = F ◦M#q
is PSO secure.
M1 and M2 are the same mechanism: on every input x, the output distributions are identical.
Therefore Mq is PSO secure.
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4.3 Failure to Compose
4.3.1 Failure to compose ω(log n) times
The security of a single count (Corollary 4.3) easily extends to O(log n)-many counts (even adap-
tively chosen), as the size of the codomain grows polynomially. However, our next theorem states
that a fixed set of ω(log(n)) counts suffices to predicate single out with probability close to e−1
(which can be amplified to 1− negl(n)).
Theorem 4.6. For a collection of predicates Q = (q0, . . . , qm), let M#Q(x) , (M#q0(x), . . . ,M#qm(x)).
Let X = {0, 1}m and D = Um the uniform distribution over X. There exists Q and an adversary
A such that
Succ
A,M#Q
≤2−m (n) ≥ B(n, 1/n)− negl(n).
Choosing m = ω(log(n)) yields 2−m = negl(n).
Proof. Let q0 be any predicate such that weightUm(q0) ≤ 1/n such that Prx←Unm [iso(q0,x)] ≥
B(n, 1/n) − negl(n). For instance, q0(x) = 1 iff x < 2m/n (where in the last inequality we treat x
as a number written in binary).17
For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, define the predicate qi(x) , (q0(x) ∧ x[i]), and let yi = M#qi(x). Consider
the deterministic adversary A that on input M#Q(x) = (y0, . . . , ym) outputs the predicate
p(x) = q0(x) ∧
(
m∧
i=1
(
x[i] = yi
))
.
Observe that iso(q0,x) =⇒ iso(p,x) and that by construction weightUm(p) = 2−m. Thus
Succ
A,M#Q
≤2−m (n) = Prx←Unm
p←A(M#Q(x))
[iso(p,x)]
≥ Pr
x←Unm
p←A(M#Q(x))
[iso(q0,x)]
≥ B(n, 1/n)− negl(n)
Remark 4.7. When the attack succeeds, all the predicates qi match 0 or 1 rows in x. It may seem
that an easy way to counter the attack is by masking low counts, a common measure taken e.g., in
contingency tables. However, it is easy to modify the attack to only use predicates matching Θ(n)
rows using one extra query. This means that restricting the mechanism to suppress low counts
cannot prevent this type of attack. Let q∗ be a predicate with weightUm(q
∗) = 1/2 (e.g., parity of
the bits), and let q∗i = qi ∨ q∗. The attack succeeds whenever q∗(x) = q∗0(x) + 1. If q∗(x) and q0(x)
are independent, then this occurs with probability at least 12 · B(n, 1/n) − negl(n). As before, the
probability can be amplified to 1− negl(n).
While a single count is PSO secure for any data distribution, the above attack against ω(log(n))
counts applies only to the uniform distribution Um. Using the Leftover Hash Lemma, we can
generically extend the attack to general distributions D with moderate min-entropy, at the cost of
randomizing the attacked mechanism (i.e., set of counts). Informally, we hash the data to a smaller
17Or use Claim 3.3 with wlow(n) = 1/n, and Remark 3.5.
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domain where its image will be almost uniformly distributed, and adapt the attack appropriately.
See Appendix B for details.
Theorem 4.6 can be extended to the predicate mechanism MQ; this follows from the observation
thatM#Q can be implemented by postprocessingMQ. But in fact a much stronger attack is possible.
Claim 4.8. For a collection of predicates Q = (q1, . . . , qm), let MQ(x) , (Mq1(x), . . . ,Mqm(x)).
Let X = {0, 1}m and D = Um the uniform distribution over X. For m = ω(log(n)), there exists Q
and an adversary A such that A fully predicate singles out against MQ and D.
Proof Outline. For i ∈ [m], define the predicate qi(x) = x[i], the ith bit of x. Let Qbits =
(q1, . . . , qm). For each row j ∈ [n] and column i ∈ [m], MQbits(x) outputs the bit xi[j]. The
adversary outputs the collection of predicates {pj}j∈[n] where
pj(x) =
m∧
i=1
(
x[i] = xj [i]
)
.
4.3.2 Failure to compose twice
Borrowing ideas from [NSS+18], we construct two mechanisms Mext and Menc which are individually
secure against singling out (for arbitrary distributions), but which together allow an adversary to
single out with high probability when the data is uniformly distributed over the universe X =
{0, 1}m. With more work, the composition attack can be extended to more general universes and
to distributions with sufficient min-entropy.
We divide the input dataset into three parts: a source of randomness xext = (x1, . . . , xn
2
), a
message xn, and a holdout set xhold = (xn
2
+1, . . . , xn−1) used in the proof. Mext(x) outputs an
encryption secret key s based on the rows in xext, using the von Neumann extractor.
Mechanism: Mext
input: x
s← ∅, the empty string;
for i← 1 to n2 by 2 do
if lsb(xi) = 0 ∧ lsb(xi+1) = 1 then
s← s‖0
if lsb(xi) = 1 ∧ lsb(xi+1) = 0 then
s← s‖1
end
if |s| ≥ m then
return s[1 : m], the first m bits of s
else
return ⊥
Menc(x) runs s ← Mext. If s 6= ⊥, it outputs s⊕ xn (using s as a one-time pad to encrypt xn);
otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Alone, neither s nor s ⊕ xn allows the adversary to single out, but using
both an adversary can recover xn and thereby single it out.
Theorem 4.9. Mext and Menc are secure against predicate singling out (Definition 3.6). For
m = ω(log(n)) and m ≤ n/8, X = {0, 1}m, and D = Um the uniform distribution over X, there
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exists an adversary A such that
SuccA,MExtEnc≤2−m (n) ≥ 1− negl(n),
where MExtEnc = (Mext,Menc).
Proof. Let x = (xext,xhold, xn) as described above.
Security of Mext. This is a special case of the security of the predicate mechanism Mq (Theorem 4.4)
and post-processing, with q = lsb. 18
In fact, Mext is even (ln(2), 0, 1/n, 1/n)-PSO secure. We provide a brief outline of the proof.
Consider a related mechanism M>ext that outputs > if |s| ≥ m and ⊥ otherwise. By Proposition 4.2,
M>ext is (ln(2), 0, 1/n, 1/n)-PSO secure. The security of Mext can be reduced to that of M>ext using
a generalization of Proposition 4.5 to distributions of permutations.
Security of Menc. For A, wlow(n) < negl(n), and whigh(n) = ω(log(n)/n), let
γlow = Succ
A,Menc
≤wlow (n) and γhigh = Succ
A,Menc
≥whigh (n).
We must show that γlow, γhigh < negl(n). It is easy to bound γhigh using the holdout set xhold, which
is independent of the output Menc:
γhigh ≤ Pr
x,Menc,A
[p(xhold) ≤ 1 | weightD(p) ≥ whigh] = (1−whigh)n−m−2 = o(1−log(n)/n)Ω(n) = negl(n).
To bound γlow, we consider the two possible values of p(xn). Write γlow = γ
0
low + γ
1
low where
γblow , Pr [iso(p,x) ∧ weightD(p) ≤ wlow ∧ p(xn) = b]
If A singles out and p(xn) = 1, then the it must have gleaned information about xn from the
ciphertext s⊕ xn, which should be impossible. The von Neumann extractor guarantees that either
s = ⊥ or s is uniformly distributed in {0, 1}n2 . Either way, the output of Menc(x) is information-
theoretically independent of xn. Therefore
γ1low ≤ Pr
x,Menc,A
[p(xn) = 1 | weightD(p) ≤ wlow] ≤ wlow = negl(n).
If A singles out and p(xn) = 0, then it is effectively singling out against the sub-dataset x−n =
(x1, . . . , xn−1). That is
γ0low = Pr
x,Menc,A
[iso(p,x) ∧ weightD(p) ≤ wlow ∧ p(xn) = 0]
= Pr
x,Menc,A
[iso(p,x−n) ∧ weightD(p) ≤ wlow ∧ p(xn) = 0]
18 The security of Mext does not follow from the mere fact that its output is nearly uniform. For example, the
mechanism that outputs x1 may be uniform, but it trivially allows singling out. Security would follow if the output
was nearly uniform conditioned on x.
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We construct B that tries to single out against mechanism Mext using A. We assume that B can
sample from D.19 On input s, B samples x′n ∼ D and runs p← A(s⊕ x′n).
SuccB,Mext≤wlow (n) ≥ Pr
[
iso(p,x−n) ∧ weightD(p) ≤ wlow ∧ p(x′n) = 0 ∧ p(xn) = 0
]
≥ Pr [iso(p,x−n) ∧ weightD(p) ≤ wlow ∧ p(x′n) = 0] · Pr[p(xn) = 0 | weightD(p) ≤ wlow]
≥ γ0low · (1− wlow)
≥ γ0low · (1− negl(n))
Therefore γ0low is negligible.
Insecurity of MExtEnc for D = Um. The output of MExtEnc(x) is a pair (s, c). If (s, c) = (⊥,⊥), A
aborts. The for-loop in Mext extracts n/4 uniform bits in expectation. By a Chernoff Bound, for
m ≤ n/8, Prx[s = ⊥] ≤ e−n/16 = negl(n).
If (s, c) 6= (⊥,⊥), A recovers xn = c⊕ s and outputs the predicate
p(x) =
(
x = xn
)
.
By the choice of m = ω(log(n)), weightUm(p) = 2
−m < negl(n). Pr[iso(p,x) | s 6= ⊥] = 1− Pr[∃j 6=
n : xj = xn] = 1− n · 2−m > 1− negl(n). The bound on SuccA,MExtEnc≤2−m follows, completing the proof
of the claim and the theorem.
4.3.3 Singling out and failure to compose
The failure to compose demonstrated in Section 4.3.1 capitalizes on the use of multiple counting
queries. Such queries underlie a large variety of statistical analyses and machine learning algorithms.
We expect that other attempts to formalize security against singling out would also allow counting
queries. If so, our negative composition results may generalize beyond the notion of PSO security.
The failure to compose demonstrated in Section 4.3.2 is more contrived. We expect that other
attempts to formalize security against singling out would allow mechanisms like Mext, where the
output is uniform even conditioned on the input. It is less clear to us whether a mechanism like
Menc would be allowed under other possible formalizations of security against singling out. If an
alternate formalization is to compose, it likely must forbid Menc.
5 Differential Privacy, generalization and PSO security
5.1 Preliminaries from differential privacy
For x,x′ ∈ Xn, we write x ∼ x′ if the two datasets differ on exactly one element xi.
19 It is tempting to try to remove this assumption by picking x′n arbitrarily, say x
′
n = 0
m. Because s is uniform, the
ciphertexts s⊕ xn and s⊕ x′n are identically distributed and perfectly indistinguishable. This intuition is misleading
(see also footnote 18).
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Definition 5.1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06, DKM+06]). A randomized mechanism M : Xn →
T is (, δ)-differentially private if for all x ∼ x′ ∈ Xn and for all events S ⊆ T ,
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[M(x′) ∈ S] + δ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the mechanism M .
Lemma 5.1 (Basic and Parallel Composition [DKM+06, McS09]). Let M (, δ)-differentially
private and M ′ (′, δ′)-differentially private. The mechanism M ′ ◦ M : x 7→ M ′(M(x),x) is
( + ′, δ + δ′)-differentially private. Let (x1, . . . ,x`) be a partition of x into disjoint datasets.
The mechanism M ` : (x1, . . . ,x`) 7→ (M(x1), . . . ,M(x`)) is (, δ)-differentially private.
Theorem 5.2 (Exponential Mechanism [MT07]). For domain Xn and outcome space R, let u :
Xn×R → R be a utility function. The sensitivity of u is ∆u = maxr∈Rmaxx∼x′ |u(x, r)−u(x′, r)|.
For a dataset x, let optu(x) = maxr∈R u(x, r) and let Ropt = {r ∈ R : u(x, r) = optu(x)}. For any
ε > 0, there exists a mechanism M εExp : X
n × R × u → R that is (ε, 0)-differentially private such
that for all x and all t > 0:
Pr
[
u(M εExp(x, u,R) ≤ optu(x)−
2∆u
ε
(
ln
( |R|
|Ropt|
)
+ t
)]
≤ e−t.
Our analysis of how PSO security relates to differential privacy is through a connection of
both concepts to statistical generalization. For differential privacy, this connection was established
in [DFH+15, BNS+16]. We will also use a variant of the latter result from [NS15]:20
Lemma 5.3 (Generalization lemma). Let A : (Xn)` → 2X × [`] be an (, δ)-differentially private
algorithm that operates on ` sub-databases and outputs a predicate p : X → {0, 1} and an index
i ∈ [`]. Let ~x = (x1, . . . ,x`) where every xi ∼ Dn is a database containing i.i.d. elements from D,
and let (p, i)← A(~x). Then
E
~x∼(Dn)`
[
E
(p,i)←A(~x)
[p(xi)]
]
≤ e · E
~x∼(Dn)`
[
E
(p,i)←A(~x)
[weightD(p)]
]
+ `δ (3)
E
~x∼(Dn)`
[
E
(p,i)←A(~x)
[p(xi)]
]
≥ e−
(
E
~x∼(Dn)`
[
E
(p,i)←A(~x)
[weightD(p)]
]
− `δ
)
. (4)
5.2 Differential privacy implies PSO security
Theorem 5.4. For all ε = O(1), δ = negl(n), wlow ≤ 1/n, and whigh(n) = ω(log n/n), if M is
(ε, δ)-differentially private, then M is (ε′, δ′, wlow, whigh)-PSO secure for
ε′ = ε+ (n− 1) ln
(
1
1− wlow
)
and δ′ = negl(n).
For wlow = o(1/n), ε
′ = ε+ o(1).21
Proof. The theorem consists of Claims 5.5 and 5.6, each using one part of the generalization lemma.
That lemma holds even when the distribution D is known, a fact used in both proofs.
20The proof of Equation 3 of Lemma 5.3 is identical to that of Lemma 3.3 in [NS15], skipping the last inequality
in the proof. The proof of Equation 4 is analogous.
21For all wlow ≤ 1/n and n, ε′ < ε+ 1 by the fact that (1− wlow)n−1 ≥ (1− 1/n)n−1 > e−1.
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Claim 5.5. If M is (, δ)-d.p., then for all A and wlow ∈ [0, 1/n]
SuccA,M≤wlow(n) ≤ eε
′ · base(n,wlow) + nδ.
Claim 5.6. For ε = O(1) and δ = negl(n), if M is (, δ)-d.p., then for all A and all whigh =
ω(log n/n),
α , SuccA,M≥whigh(n) ≤ negl(n).
Proof of Claim 5.5. Let w∗ = max{w ≤ wlow : w realizeable under D}. Given p← A(M(x)), wlow,
and D, define the predicate p∗:
p∗(x) ≡
{
p(x) if weightD(p) ≤ wlow
0 if weightD(p) > wlow
Observe that weightD(p
∗) ≤ w∗. The predicate p∗ can be computed from p, D, and wlow without
further access to x. Because differential privacy is closed under post-processing, if M is (ε, δ)-
differentially private, then the computation that produces p∗ is as well.
SuccA,M≤wlow(n) ≤ Prx,p[p(x) ≥ 1/n ∧ weightD(p) ≤ w
∗]
≤ n · E
x,p
[p∗(x)]
≤ n · (ew∗ + δ) by Lemma 5.3, ` = 1
= eε
base(n,w∗)
(1− w∗)n−1 + nδ by Claim 3.1
≤ eε base(n,w
∗)
(1− wlow)n−1 + nδ
= eε
′
base(n,wlow) + δ
′ by Claim 3.1
Proof of Claim 5.6. Fix an adversary A. We construct an algorithm B in an attempt to violate the
Generalization Lemma for ` = O( lognα ):
Input: D, ~x ∼ (Dn)`
I ← ∅, the empty set;
for i← 1, . . . , ` do
pi ← A(M(xi));
ui = −pi(xi);
if weightD(pi) ≥ whigh then
I ← I ∪ {i}
end
Let u : i 7→ −pi(xi) for i ∈ I;
i∗ ←M εExp(~x, I, u);
return (i∗, pi∗)
M is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and M εExp (Theorem 5.2) is (ε, 0)-differentially private. By basic
and paraellel composition, B is (2ε, δ)-differentially private.
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Define the event PSO to be the event that A successfully predicate singles out on one of the
sub-databases with a high-weight predicate: PSO = {∃i ∈ [`] : iso(pi,xi) ∧ weightD(pi) ≥ whigh}.
By the choice of `, Pr[PSO] = 1 − (1− α)` ≥ 1 − 1n . Conditioned on PSO, maxi∈I u(i) ≥ −1/n.
∆u = 1/n, and |I| ≤ `. The Exponential Mechanism guarantees that
Pr
~x;(pi∗ ,i∗)←B(~x)
[
pi∗(xi∗) ≥ 1
n
+
2
nε
(ln `+ t) | PSO
]
≤ e−t.
Choosing t = lnn and using the fact that pi∗(xi∗) ≤ 1,
E
~x;(pi∗ ,i∗)←B(~x)
[pi∗(xi∗) | PSO] ≤ 1
n
+
2
nε
(ln `+ lnn) +
1
n
.
E
~x;(pi∗ ,i∗)←B(~x)
[pi∗(xi∗)] = Pr[¬PSO]E[pi∗(xi∗) | ¬PSO] + Pr[PSO]E[pi∗(xi∗) | PSO]
≤ Pr[¬PSO] + E[pi∗(xi∗) | PSO]
<
3
n
+
2
nε
(ln `+ lnn).
E
~x;(pi∗ ,i∗)←B(~x)
[weightD(pi∗)] = Pr[¬PSO]E[weightD(pi∗) | ¬PSO] + Pr[PSO]E[weightD(pi∗) | PSO]
≥ Pr[PSO] · E[weightD(pi∗) | PSO]
≥ (1− 1
n
) · whigh
>
3whigh
4
Applying the Lemma for the (2ε, δ)-d.p. mechanism B,
3
n
+
2
nε
(ln `+ t) ≥ e−2ε
(
3whigh
4
− `δ
)
.
If δ = ω(αn ), then by the assumption that δ is negligible, α = negl(n). Otherwise δ = O(
α
n ) =
O( lognn` ) and
2
ε
(ln `+ lnn) ≥ 3nwhigh −O(log n)
4e2ε
.
For ε = O(1) and whigh = ω(
logn
n ), ln ` + lnn = ω(log n). By the choice of ` = O(
logn
α ), α =
negl(n).
6 Does k-anonymity provide PSO security?
k-anonymity [SS98, Swe02] is a strategy intended to help a data holder “release a version of its
private data with scientific guarantees that the individuals who are the subjects of the data cannot
be re-identified while the data remain practically useful” [Swe02]. It is achieved by making each
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individual in a data release indistinguishable from at least k − 1 individuals. Typically, a k-
anonymized dataset is produced by subjecting it to a sequence of generalization and suppression
operations.
The Article 29 Working Party Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques concludes that k-anonymity
prevents singling out [A29b]. In this section, we analyze the extent to which k-anonymity provides
PSO security. We show that k-anonymized dataset typically provides an attacker information
which is sufficient to predicate singling out with constant probability. This result challenges the
determination of the Article 29 Working Party.22
6.1 Preliminaries
Let (A1, . . . , Am) be attribute domains. A dataset x = (x1, . . . , xn) is collection of rows xi =
(ai,1, . . . , ai,m) where ai,j ∈ Aj . For subsets âi,j ⊆ Aj , we view yi = (âi,1, . . . , âi,m) as a set in the
natural way, writing xi ∈ yi if ∀j ∈ [m], ai,j ∈ âi,j . We say that a dataset y = (y1, . . . , yn) is derived
from x by generalization and suppression if ∀i ∈ [n], xi ∈ yi. For example, if (A1, A2, A3) correspond
to “5 digit ZIP Code,” “Gender,” and “Year of Birth,” then it may be that xi = (91015, F, 1972)
and yi = (91010–91019, F, 1970–1975).
k-anonymity aims to capture a sort of anonymity of a crowd: a data release y is k-anonymous
if any individual row in the release cannot be distinguished from k − 1 other individuals. Let
count(y, y) , |{i ∈ [n] : yi = y}| be the number of rows in y which agree with y.23
Definition 6.1 (k-Anonymity (rephrased from [Swe02])). For k ≥ 2, a dataset y is k-anonymous
if count(y, yi) ≥ k for all i ∈ [n]. An algorithm is called a k-anonymizer if on an input dataset x
its output is a k-anonymous y which is derived from x by generalization and suppression.
Our goal is to relate k-anonymity and PSO security. It will be convenient to define a general-
ization of k-anonymity—predicate k-anonymity which captures the core property of k-anonymity
but relaxes its strict syntactic requirements.
For a predicate φ : X → {0, 1} and dataset x, let xφ = {x ∈ x : φ(x) = 1}. We assume that
|xφ| is computable given the output of the k-anonymizer, but this does not qualitatively affect the
results in this section.
Definition 6.2 (Predicate k-anonymity). Let Anon be an algorithm mapping a dataset x ∈ Xn to
a collection of predicates Φ = {φ : X → {0, 1}}. For k ≥ 2 we call Anon predicate k-anonymous if
for all φ ∈ Φ, |xφ| ≥ k.
k-anonymity is a special case of predicate k-anonymity that considers only specific collections
of predicates Φ induced by a dataset y:
Φ = {φy(x) = 1 ⇐⇒ x ∈ y}y∈y.24
Definition 6.3. A predicate k anonymizer is kmax-bounded if ∀x,∃φ ∈ Φ such that |xφ| ≤ kmax.
22Our results hold equally for `-diversity [MKGV07] and t-closeness [LLV07] which the Article 29 Working Party
also concludes prevent singling out.
23Often count is paramaterized by a subset Q of the attribute domains called a quasi-identifier. This parameteri-
zation affect our analysis and we omit it for simplicity.
24See also the definition of k-anonymity for face images [NSM05, Definition 2.10]. Using the notation of that paper,
it is also special case of predicate k-anonymity, with Φ = {φΓd(Γ) = 1 ⇐⇒ f(Γ) = Γd}Γd∈Hd
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6.2 Illustrative examples
Before presenting a formal technical analysis, we provide two illustrative examples of very simple
k-anonymizers that fail to provide security against predicate singling out. For both examples, let
D = U` be the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n. The dataset x consists of n records sampled i.i.d.
from D.
Bit suppression. This k-anonymizer processes groups of k rows in index order and suppresses all
bit locations where the k rows disagree. Namely, for each group g of k rows (xgk+1, . . . , xgk+k)) it
outputs k copies of the string yg ∈ {0, 1, ?}n where yg[j] = b ∈ {0, 1} if xgk+1[j] = · · · = xgk+k[j] = b
(i.e., all the k rows in the group have b as their jth bit) and yg[j] = ? otherwise.
In the terminology of Definition 6.2, the predicate φg(x) evaluates to 1 if yg[j] ∈ {x[j], ?} for all
j ∈ [n] and evaluates to 0 otherwise. Namely, φg(x) checks whether x agrees with yg (and hence
with all of xgk+1, . . . , xgk+k)) on all non-suppressed bits.
In expectation, n/2k positions of yg are not suppressed. For large enough n, with high probabil-
ity over the choice of x, at least n
2·2k positions in yg are not suppressed. In this case, weightD(φg) ≤
2
− n
2·2k which is a negligible function of n for any constant k.
We now show how φg can be used adversarially. In expectation n(1− 2−k) ≥ 3n/4 positions of
yg are suppressed. For large enough n, with high probability over the choice of x at least n/2 of the
positions in yg are suppressed. Denote these positions ii, . . . , in/2. Define the predicate pk(x) that
evaluates to 1 if the binary number resulting from concatenating x[i1], x[i2], . . . , x[in/2] is greater
than 2n/2/k and 0 otherwise. Note that weightD(pk) ≈ 1/k and hence pk isolates within the group g
with probability ≈ 1/e ≈ 0.37, as was the case with the trivial adversary described at the beginning
of Section 3.
An attacker observing φg can now define a predicate p(x) = φg(x) ∧ pk(x). By the analysis
above, weight(p) is negligible (as it is bounded by weight(φg)) and p(x) isolates a row in x with
probability ≈ 0.37. Hence, the k-anonymizer of this example fails to protect against singling out.
Theorem 6.1 below captures the intuition from our bit suppression example and generalizes
it, hence demonstrating that k-anonymity would not typically protect against predicate singling
out. We note that Theorem 6.1 does not capture all possible ways in which the outcome of a
k-anonymizer can be exploited, in particular, the following simple example.
Interval Buckets. This k-anonymizer sorts the rows in lexicographic order and outputs the inter-
vals [ag, bg] = [xgk+1, xgk+k] (where the indices are after sorting and renaming). The corresponding
predicate φag ,bg(x) = 1 if x ∈ [ag, bg].
Observe that any of the endpoints ag or bg reveal a row in x and hence an adversary can
predicate single out with probability 1 using predicates of weight 2−n.
6.3 k-Anonymity enables predicate singling out
Theorem 6.1. For any kmax ≥ 2, there exists an (efficient, uniform, randomized) algorithm A
such that for all D with min-entropy λ ≥ m + 2 log(1/α2) + kmax log n (for m ∈ N, α), and all
predicate anonymizers Anon that are kmax-bounded, and all wlow > 0:
SuccA,Anon≤wlow (n) ≥ η · (e−1 − 2−mn− kα2)
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where
η , Pr
x←Dn
φ←Anon(x)
[weightD(φ) ≤ wlow(n)] .
For distributions with sufficient min-entropy (m = ω(log n), α = negl(n)), the adversary’s
success probability is approximately η/e ≈ η · B(k, 1/k). To predicate single out, the adversary
must output a predicate that both isolates x and has low weight. The theorem shows that these two
requirements essentially decompose: η is the probability that the predicate k-anonymizer outputs
a low-weight predicate and B(k, 1/k) is the probability that a trivial adversary predicate singles
out a dataset of size k. Algorithms for k-anonymity generally try to preserve as much information
in the dataset as possible. We expect such algorithms to typically yield low-weight predicates and
correspondingly high values of η.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. On input Φ ← Anon(x), A selects φ ∈ Φ such that 2 ≤ |xφ| ≤ kmax. A will
construct some predicate q and output the conjunction p , φ ∧ q. Noting that weightD(p) ≤
weightD(φ), and that iso(q,xφ) =⇒ iso(p,x),
SuccA,Anon≤wlow (n) ≥ Pr [iso(q,xφ) ∧ weightD(φ) ≤ wlow]
= η · Pr [iso(q,xφ) ∣∣ weightD(φ) ≤ wlow] (5)
Claim 6.2. There exists A such that for all kφ ≥ 2
Pr
x←Dn
φ←Anon(x)
p←A(φ,w)
[
iso(q,xφ)
∣∣∣ |xφ| = kφ ∧ weightD(φ) ≤ wlow] ≥ B(kφ, 1/kφ)− 2−mn− kα2.
The claim is discussed below and proved in Appendix C. Using the claim we get:
Pr
[
iso(q,xφ)
∣∣ weightD(φ) ≤ wlow] = kmax∑
kφ=k
Pr [|xφ| = kφ] · Pr
[
iso(q,xφ)
∣∣ |xφ| = kφ ∧ weightD(φ) ≤ wlow]
≥
∑
kφ
Pr [|xφ| = kφ] ·
(
B(kφ, 1/kφ)− 2−mn− kα2
)
= E
kφ
[B(kφ, 1/kφ)]− 2−mn− kα2
≥ e−1 − 2−mn− kα2 (6)
The last inequality follows from the fact that for all kφ ≥ 2, (1− 1/kφ)kφ−1 > e−1. Combining (6)
with (5) completes the proof.
The proof of Claim 6.2 uses the Leftover Hash Lemma in a manner closely resembling Lemma 3.4,
but with an additional challenge. The earlier application of LHL proved that a random hash func-
tion selected appropriately isolates a row with probability close to e−1. It relied on the fact that
each row was sampled i.i.d. from a distribution with min-entropy. In contrast, the rows in xφ are a
function of Anon and the whole dataset x. They are not independently distributed and even their
marginal distributions may be different than D.
We can use the LHL to prove the claim if we can show that the rows in xφ still have sufficient
(conditional) min-entropy. The following lemma (proved in Appendix C) does exactly that.
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Lemma 6.3. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be i.i.d. random variables and let F be a (randomized) function map-
ping (Y1, . . . , Yn) to (j, I) where j ∈ [n] and I ⊆ [n] \ {j} of size |I| = k − 1. Let YI = {Yi}i∈I .
H˜∞(Yj
∣∣ YI) ≥ H∞(Yj)− (k − 1) log n ≥ H∞(Y1)− k log n.
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A Omitted proofs from Section 3
Proof of Claim 3.1. For w ∈ [0, 1], let Pw = {p : weightD(p) = w}. First, we show that for all w,
base(n, Pw) ≤ B(n,w). For any fixed predicate p,
Pr
x∼Dn
[iso(p,x)] =
(
n
1
)
· weightD(p) · (1− weightD(p))n−1 = B(n,weightD(p)).
For a trivial adversary T, let αw(T) = PrT(⊥)[weightD(p) = w].
base(n, Pw) = B(n,w) · sup
Trivial T
αw(T) (7)
If w is realizable under D, then there exists a deterministic trivial adversary T with αw(T) = 1;
otherwise αw(T) = 0 for all T.
ForW ⊆ [0, 1], let PW = {p : weightD(p) ∈W}. By definition, base(n, PW ) ≥ supw∈W base(n, Pw).
Next, we show that in fact base(n, PW ) = supw∈W base(n, Pw). Suppose, towards contradiction, that
base(n, PW ) > supw∈W base(n, Pw). Then there exists trivial T with Succ
T,⊥
PW
(n) > supw∈W base(n, Pw).
There must also exist an deterministic trivial adversary T′ with SuccT
′,⊥
PW
(n) ≥ SuccT,⊥PW (n) but which
always outputs predicates of a single weight w′ ∈W , a contradiction.
Combining with (7): for any W ,
base(n, PW ) = sup
w∈W
realizable
B(n,w).
Because B(n,w) monotonically increases as w → 1/n,
sup
w≤wlow
realizable
B(n,w) = B(n,w∗low)
sup
w≥whigh
realizable
B(n,w) = B(n,w∗high)
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Proof of Lemma 3.4. We prove the lemma for w ≥ 2−(m−1); the proof for w ≤ 1 − 2−(m−1) is
analogous. Identify the set {0, 1}m with the set {0, 1, . . . , 2m − 1} in the natural way. For y ∈
{0, 1}m, define the function r(y) , y2m−1 , the projection of y onto the interval [0, 1]. Let 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ w
be some constant to be chosen later, and let wm be the greatest multiple of 2
−m less or equal to
w −∆.
Pr
y∈R{0,1}m
[r(y) ≤ w −∆] = Pr
y∈R{0,1}m
[r(y) ≤ wm]
= wm + 2
−m
∈ [w −∆, w −∆ + 2−m] (8)
Let H = {h : X → {0, 1}m} be 2-universal family of hash functions. For each h ∈ H we define the
predicate ph:
ph(x) =
{
1 r(h(x)) ≤ w −∆
0 r(h(x)) > w −∆ .
By the Leftover Hash Lemma, for every α > 0 to be chosen later and every λ ≥ m + 2 log(1/α2),
if D has min-entropy at least λ then (
h, h(x)
)
h∈RH
x∼D
is α2-close to the uniform distribution over H ×Xn in total variation distance. By Corollary 2.3
h(D) is α-close to uniform over X with probability at least 1−α over h ∈R H. For such h, by (8),
weightD(ph) = Pr
x←D
[ph(x) ≤ w −∆] ∈
[
w −∆− α, w −∆ + 2−m + α].
Set α = 2−m and ∆ = 2α. Then weightD(ph) ∈ [w − 3 · 2−m, w] with probability at least 1 − α =
1− 2−m whenever λ ≥ m+ 2 log(1/α2) = 5m, completing the proof.
B Omitted proofs from Section 4
Given a 2-universal family of functions H = {h : X → {0, 1}m}, a mechanism M and adversary
A, we construct a new randomized mechanism MH and new adversary AH . The following lemma
relates the success probability of the modified AH with respect to D to that of A with respect to
Um.
Mechanism: MH : X → Y
fixed: H = {h : X → {0, 1}m}, and M : {0, 1}m → Y
input: x ∈ X
sample h ∈R H;
return (h,M(h(x)))
Lemma B.1. For any A there exists AH such that for all M , wlow, whigh, α > 0 and D ∈ ∆(X)
with min-entropy λ > m+ 2 log(1/α2):
∣∣∣SuccAH ,MH≤wlow+α(n,D)− SuccA,M≤wlow(n,Um)∣∣∣ ≤ nα
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where Succ(n,D) (respectively, Succ(n,Um)) denotes the PSO success probability with respect to the
distribution D (respectively, Um) as in Definition 3.3.
Proof. For a predicate p on {0, 1}m we define a corresponding predicate on X: ph(x) , p(h(x)).
On input (h, y)←MH(x), AH simulates p← A(y) and outputs ph.
We call h ∈ H good if h(D) is α-close to Um. By Corollary 2.3, (1− α)-fraction of h are good.
By the goodness of h, if weightUm(p) ≤ wlow then weightD(ph) ≤ wlow + α.∣∣∣SuccAH ,MH≤wlow+α(n,D)− SuccA,M≤wlow(n,Um)∣∣∣ ≤ SD(Unm, h(Dn)) ≤ nα
Corollary B.2. Let α = negl(n) and λ = m + 2 log(1/α2). For any m = ω(log(n)), there exists
a distribution over O(m)-many predicates Qh, a negligible function wlow(n), and an adversary A
such that for all D with min-entropy at least λ:
Succ
A,M#Qh
≤wlow (n) ≥ 1− negl(n).
Proof. The success probability in Theorem 4.6 is easily amplified from 1/e to 1 − negl(n) by rep-
etition. Applying Lemma B.1 to the result almost completes the proof; it remains to verify that
the resulting mechanism MH can be written as M#Qh for some Qh = (q
h
0 , . . . , q
h
m). To do so, take
qhi (x) = qi(h(x)), where qi is from the proof of Theorem 4.6.
Remark B.3. Corollary B.2 is only meaningful as an example of a failure of composition if each
M#qhi
taken in isolation is PSO secure, something that is not provided by Lemma B.1. However,
M#qhi
is an instance of the counting mechanism and thus secure.
C Omitted proofs from Section 6
Proof of Lemma 6.3. We prove the second inequality first. The idea in used in (9) is used in (10).
2−H∞(Yj) = max
y
Pr[Yj = y]
≤ max
y
Pr[∃` ∈ [n], Y` = y] (9)
≤ n ·max
y
Pr[Y1 = 1]
= 2logn−H∞(Yj)
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The first inequality:
2−H˜∞(Yj |YI) = E
YI
[
max
y
Pr[Yj = y
∣∣∣ YI ]]
=
∑
yI
Pr[YI = yI ] ·
(
max
y
Pr[Yj = y
∣∣∣ YI = yI ])
=
∑
yI
max
y
(
Pr[YI = yI ] · Pr[Yj = y
∣∣∣ YI = yI ])
=
∑
yI
max
y
(
Pr[Yj = y] · Pr[YI = yI
∣∣∣ Yj = y])
≤
∑
yI
max
y
(
Pr[Yj = y] · Pr[∀i ∈ I, ∃` ∈ [n] \ {j}, Y` = yi
∣∣∣ Yj = y]) (10)
=
∑
yI
max
y
(
Pr[Yj = y] · Pr[∀i ∈ I, ∃` ∈ [n] \ {j}, Y` = yi]
)
=
∑
yI
Pr[∀i ∈ I, ∃` ∈ [n] \ {j}, Y` = yi] ·max
y
Pr[Yj = y]
= max
y
Pr[Yj = y] ·
∑
yI
1
≤
(
n
k − 1
)
· 2−H∞(Yj)
≤ 2(k−1) logn−H∞(Yj)
The proof of Claim 6.2 applies the following corollary of the Leftover Hash Lemma. For random
variables Y1, . . . , Yk, and j ∈ [n], let Y−j = {Yi : i 6= j}.
Corollary C.1 (Corollary to Leftover Hash Lemma (2.2)). For every Y1, . . . , Yk if ∀j ∈ [n],
H˜∞(Yj
∣∣∣ Y−j) = λ ≥ m + 2 log(1/α2), then (h(Y1), . . . , h(Yk))h∈RH is kα2-close to uniform over
({0, 1}m)k in total variation distance.
Proof.
Proof of Claim 6.2. The construction of q uses the Leftover Hash Lemma and is very similar to the
construction of the predicates in Lemma 3.4. Identify the set {0, 1}m with the set {0, 1, . . . , 2m−1}
in the natural way. For y ∈ {0, 1}m, define the function r(y) , y2m−1 , the projection of y onto the
interval [0, 1].
Let wφ be the multiple of 2
−m closest to 1/kφ. Observe that |B(kφ, wφ) − B(kφ, 1/kφ)| ≤∣∣∣wφ − 1kφ ∣∣∣ ·maxw′∈[0,1] ∣∣dBdw (w′)∣∣ ≤ 2−mn.
Let H = {h : X → {0, 1}m} be a 2-universal family of hash functions. For each h ∈ H define
the predicate qh:
qh(x) =
{
1 r(h(x)) < wφ
0 r(h(x)) ≥ wφ
.
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Because wφ is a multiple of 2
−m,
Pr
y∈R{0,1}m
[r(y) < wφ] = wφ
By Lemma 6.3, xφ (viewed as a kφ-tuple of random variables) satisfies the average min-entropy
hypothesis of Corollary C.1. Applying that Corollary:
Pr
xφ,qh
[
iso(q,xφ)
∣∣∣ |xφ| = kφ ∧ weightD(φ) ≤ wlow] ≥ Pr
y1,...,ykφ∈R{0,1}m
[∃ unique j ∈ [kφ] : r(yj) < wφ]− kφα2
= B(kφ, wφ)− kφα2
≥ B(kφ, 1/kφ)− 2−mn− kφα2.
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